We set up a model to study how 
INTRODUCTION 1
The interaction between finance and labor has been studied with increasing interest in recent years (Pagano and Volpin, 2008) . One aspect of the debate is the possibility of employees (or other groups, which we will refer to as "stakeholders" ) making firm-specific investment in human capital from which the firm will benefit. However, stakeholders may be deterred from such investment if they are not adequately rewarded for it because managers or shareholders will expropriate their (quasi-)rents (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) . This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on this issue by trying to identify the circumstances under which such holdup situations are likely to occur by linking holdup situations to corporate ownership and governance structures prevalent in different firms and different countries. We also analyze how holdup issues with respect to workers may be connected to agency problems from which shareholders suffer.
2 In any case, even if one does not believe specific human capital to be an important issue for corporate governance, our model may still be of interest for the distributive issue of how rents produced by the corporation are assigned to managers, controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and workers.
The bulk of the corporate governance literature is concerned with private benefits of control, which allow the controller of the firm to usurp part of the corporate patrimony that minority investors would have expected to participate in (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . It is part of the conventional wisdom in comparative corporate governance that agency problems differ greatly between firms with dispersed ownership and those with concentrated ownership. The main issue within the former is managerial agency problems, while in the latter it is agency problems resulting from the presence of a large shareholder (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997:758-761 ). Thus, policymakers in different countries need to look at different issues depending on which kind of ownership predominates in a particular corporate governance system. Differences in the firm's interaction with other stakeholders, such as workers, are a less researched issue. From an empirical point of view, it is sometimes pointed out that across the OECD countries, there appears to be a negative correlation between the strength of employment and labor law protection and ownership dispersion (Belloc and Pagano, 2009 ). It is not clear whether there is a causal relation between the two factors or whether they constitute a set of institutional complementarities. Roe (2003) suggests that stronger employment law and social democratic policies in general might increase the incentives to concentrate ownership due to exacerbated managerial agency problems, while other scholars emphasize a possible (additional) opposite causal relation with pro-labor laws as a reaction to the concentration of power by virtue of corporate ownership (Gelter, 2009; Belloc and Pagano, 2009). Whether the latter direction of causality is plausible depends partly on assumptions that are often not made very clear in the comparative corporate governance literature. On the one hand, it is possible that large shareholders are better able to exploit non-shareholder constituencies, and that pro-employee institutions have risen in reaction to concentrated ownership (cf. Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001:116; Jackson, 2005:258) . On the other hand, one could also hypothesize that large shareholders are better able to commit to the firm in the long run, thus assuring to stakeholders that specific investment can safely be made without needing to fear ex-post expropriation of rents (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2003:451; Woolcock, 1996:183) . The counterargument to this proposition is that shareholders presumably are the financial beneficiary of holding up stakeholders. Large, controlling shareholders (or coalitions of large shareholders) who are able to influence management could therefore both be in a good position and have strong incentives to "expropriate" workers. By contrast, the literature suggesting that this long-term commitment to employees is prevalent seems to presume that managers in dispersed ownership systems are forced by market mechanisms, most of all by hostile takeovers, to expropriate workers where shareholders can benefit financially (e.g. Franks and Mayer, 1998:728-729 ).
3
It is questionable whether this assumption holds very often. In recent years, legal scholars have increasingly pointed out that managers in the US, which is considered to be the paradigmatic dispersed ownership system, are typically relatively insulated from shareholders and often do not have strong incentives to pursue shareholder wealth maximization. In particular, there is persuasive evidence that Delaware corporate law has developed in a way that offers managers highly effective means of shielding themselves against hostile takeovers (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . Scholars of comparative corporate law point out that the US corporate governance system, taking both the legal and financial structures into account, provides for a considerably weaker position for shareholders vis-à-vis management than others, including the system in place in the UK (e.g. Enriques et al., 2009:83) .
4 While this aspect of US corporate governance often leads to considerable criticism (e.g. Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) , others have attempted to find efficiency explanations (Bainbridge, 2003; Elhauge, 2005) . On the basis of the contribution to the theory of the firm by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have developed a team production theory of corporate law (Blair and Stout, 1999, 2006) . Their core claim is that the insulation of managers from shareholders is efficient because it protects employees and other stakeholders from holdup. Similarly, others have suggested that taking the firm public reduces the possibility of shareholder intervention, effectively allowing managers and/or employees some leeway to capture private benefits if the firm is successful (Burkart et al., 1997; Brealey et al., 2006:949) . This kind of argument has problems in firms or corporate governance systems characterized by concentrated ownership. In such systems, other mechanisms such as co-determination or employment law may help to protect stakeholders from holdup (cf. Fauver and Fuerst, 2006:679-680; Armour and Deakin, 2003:445-452) . Thus, it has been suggested that pro-employee laws may be relatively more desirable in corporate governance systems where concentrated ownership is widespread than in dispersed ownership systems.
Furthermore, stronger employee protection may be more beneficial in systems with more vibrant markets for hostile takeovers compared to systems where managers can effectively shield themselves against hostile bidders (Gelter, 2009 ).
5
The two possibilities regarding the effects of ownership structure on stakeholders seem to be irreconcilable at first glance, as two mutually exclusive phenomena (the presence of large blockholders and ownership dispersion) are interpreted as the solution to the problem of long-term commitment to these groups. Our paper seeks to provide a reconciliation on the basis of an identification of the reasons why the effective "controller" of a firm (either a manager or a large shareholder) may refrain from expropriating either shareholders or stakeholders, or both. We argue that expropriating either shareholders or stakeholders comes at a cost. Depending on the respective corporate and labor laws, some resources must be invested in expropriation. Many of these costs are borne by the firm. While the controller can always expect some financial benefit from expropriation, we argue that sometimes she has to bear some additional (private) costs of expropriation herself, which creates a countervailing incentive. On the basis of these costs, whose real-life interpretation we discuss in some detail below, we identify various prototypical "structures" of firms that depend on the nature of the private costs borne by the controller. Thus, the extent to which shareholders and/or employees are "expropriated" will depend (1) on the controller's ownership share, (2) on the strength of the applicable law protecting the respective group, and (3) on the presence of private "costs of expropriation" not borne by the firm, but by the controller. Ultimately, whether blockholders or the managers of a dispersed firm are more likely to engage in long-term bonding with employees will depend on their private cost of expropriation (although the controlling shareholders' larger financial stake certainly has an impact as well). Our model thus provides a framework for future analysis as to the circumstances under which managers and controlling shareholders favor outside investors or employees.
At the same time, our model shows how the expropriation of (non-controlling) shareholders and stakeholders are connected. In the presence of a positive cost of expropriation, employees may benefit from laws intended to protect shareholders. Holdup gains from putting pressure on employees result in higher ex-post shareholder value (in the form of higher dividends or stock price). This implies that the controller's incentive to be tough on employees depends on the extent to which he has to share these gains with minority shareholders. In other words, if legal protection against private benefits of control is strong, the incentive to engage in holdup of employees will be reduced, since the controller will have to share a large proportion of holdup gains with minority shareholders. Thus, corporate law and employment law may to some extent be substitutes, and the interests of investors and employees may sometimes be aligned, which may explain the political coalitions between these two groups against managers that some scholars have identified.
THE MODEL

GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Our model attempts to integrate specific investments by workers, holdup of workers by the controller of the firm, and expropriation of minority investors by the controller of the firm. The person in control of the firm, who we refer to as the manager, could, on one hand, represent senior management in a publicly traded firm with dispersed ownership or, on the other hand, a single large shareholder or a coalition of large blockholders effectively controlling a firm through concentrated share ownership. In the second case, it is assumed that conflicts of interest between a third-party manager and the controlling shareholder are negligible; we consider only conflicts of interest between controlling and non-controlling shareholders as the relevant agency conflict in this case. In our model, the two archetypal types of ownership structure are distinguished by the amount of shares held by the manager.
In either case, we assume that the manager needs outside shareholders to finance the firm and that employees make firm-specific investments (e.g. in human capital). This allows the firm to operate and to produce a surplus. The manager subsequently decides how to allocate the surplus between outside investors, employees, and himself. Both investors and employees have a baseline expectation about their share of the surplus. The manager can decide to withhold part of the expected share from these groups, which we refer to as "minority expropriation" and "employee exploitation" respectively. However, exploitation of either group is costly, and the manager is further constrained by corporate law and employment law.
Wages are often understood to consist of a fixed claim only. However, in our model, the wage accorded to employees and their baseline expectation is assumed to include rewards that are part of an implicit contract, such as certain types of retirement benefits, expectations regarding job security and advancement within the corporate hierarchy, and the safety of working conditions.
In the model we assume that the value of the production depends upon the effort put up by workers. We devise a two-stage game where the effort of workers is perfectly observable and the manager has the first-mover advantage.
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1. In the first stage, the manager chooses the level of worker and minority expropriation.
2. In the second stage, workers choose the optimal level of effort (i.e. the amount of costly specific investments). Since both decisions are observable and agents are rational, the level of expropriation that the manager will choose in the first stage will depend upon the effect on workers' effort he expects in the second stage.
Parameter p c ∈ 0; 1 measures the degree of protection against the expropriation of non-controlling shareholders,
8 while the standard of protection granted by labor law is measured by parameter p L ∈ 0; 1. In our model, employment law is understood to either prevent exploitation outright (e.g. by making it hard or costly to make workers redundant) or by giving considerable bargaining powers to workers and unions (e.g. because of mandatory co-determination, consultation requirements or the requirement to negotiate a costly social plan for redundant employees).
The "gross" value of the output produced by the firm is ge, where e is the effort of the workers, g ′  0 and g ′′  0. Once the production process is complete, the manager can conceal part of the output: this share corresponds to the "private benefits of control that show up as operating costs " 9 before any benefits are conferred to labor. At this point, the manager can extract resources to the detriment of both salaries (and employee benefits) and profits (e.g. through accounting fraud which will hurt both constituencies).
10
The amount of the hidden production will be h p c   K  1 − p c  ge, and K ∈ 0; 1.
11 Hence the value of production from which profits and salaries are computed as xe  ge − h p c  The "net" wage w earned by the worker is a function of three variables: ( i ) , the contractual share of the value of production to be used to pay labor 12 (the greater the value of , the bigger the value of w), ( ii ) p L , the protection granted by labor law 13 (the greater the value of p L , the bigger the value of w ) and ( iii ) c L , the amount of resources spent by the manager to expropriate workers (the greater the value of c L , the smaller the value of w ). Depending on the particular circumstances of the case (explained below), this cost will be borne by the firm or by the manager himself. 
is the share in profit to which shareholders (as a class) are entitled according to their share of ownership, weighted by the protection granted by corporate law.  is the amount of profits that the controller is able to divert from profits before the distribution of dividends (to the detriment of minority shareholders), for which he actively has to spend resources. In order to capture the fact that acquiring  is a costly activity, and that the ability to expropriate minorities depends also upon the share of ownership f and the protection granted by corporate law, we assume the following.
The rules of corporate law that we attempt to capture are the ones usually described as "shareholder protection" in the literature, such as the ones preventing or penalizing asset diversion or dilution of stock value (see generally Djankov et al., 2008) . c c is the amount of resources devoted to minority shareholder exploitation. We also assume that the marginal return from expropriation is decreasing:
. Note that corporate law has a dual role in our model: in the first stage (before wages are paid), it makes it harder for the manager to divert assets from the firm in a way that hurts both investors and employees. In the second stage just described, it prevents a diversion of assets to which employees are indifferent. An example of the second type could be excessive executive compensation that reduces shareholders' profits.
Workers' effort:
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that xe  2 2 e . In this case, the worker will choose the optimal amount of effort in order to maximize his own utility.
This implies that both the effort provided by the workers and the accountable productivity of the firm are affected by labor protection ( p L ), minority protection  p c , K and .
If this is the case, the manager will choose the level of worker expropriation. The level will depend upon the effect that the manager expects expropriation will have on the level of effort provided by workers. Note that our model only accounts for a possible incentivizing effect set by p L . Obviously, excessively protective, or rather badly designed, employment law could also have a "complacency" effect, which is outside of the scope of our model. However, we will address possible normative consequences in section 3.
Subsequent analysis:
Using this framework, we analyze the interaction between labor law and minority shareholder protection. In particular, we argue that these two bodies of law interact so that 1. when the degree of shareholder protection changes (e.g. as the result of a change of corporate law), the amount of worker exploitation is affected as well;
2. the exact type of interaction between these two bodies of law is firm-specific and depends on the type of firm (where firms are distinguished on the basis of who bears the cost of expropriating minority shareholders and employees);
3. a change in ownership concentration (mediated by labor and minority protection) has an ambiguous effect on the expropriation of minority investors, while it can lead to a larger expropriation of labor in certain types of firms. Furthermore, our analysis shows the significance of the size of the controlling block on the expropriation of workers.
In the following sections, we distinguish various cases, each of which is interpreted to represent specific types of firms. The cases are distinguished on the basis of whether managers personally bear a cost of expropriating (minority) shareholders and/or employees. Within each section, we can distinguish between firms where managers own only a small stake (dispersed ownership) and firms where they own a large one (concentrated ownership). In either case, a private cost of expropriation that cannot be shifted to the firm protects both minority shareholders and employees. Note that the "dispersed" and "concentrated" interpretations often differ in many respects; however, the respective version of the model applies to both because they share the structure of expropriation cost.
TYPE 1 FIRMS: NO PRIVATE COSTS OF EXPROPRIATION
In the first case, the cost of both expropriating shareholders and of exploiting workers is borne by the firm and no private costs are paid directly by the manager. Typically, tunneling transactions that will harm small shareholders (both under dispersed and under concentrated ownership) will require complex transactions and the advice of skilled professionals (such as lawyers or accountants) on how to circumvent the law. Part of the resources spent on tunneling will therefore not correspond to an advantage to the manager, but will simply be a deadweight loss. The same may apply with regard to the expropriation of workers. Firing workers, or even just threatening them with redundancy (e.g. to obtain concessions from unions) may result in transitory costs, such as reassignment of tasks within the firm or transaction costs resulting from negotiations. We assume that all of these costs are borne by the firm, hence the manager has no personal cost. There is not even a non-pecuniary cost from reduced reputation or from violations of social norms. Thus, the manager does not care whether employees or shareholders suffer, because his personal wealth is not affected. 
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The manager will choose a level of expropriation that satisfies the following first order conditions.
must increase as well. Since
to become smaller. At the same time, p c does not play any role in the first order condition for , hence a change in p c does not affect .
3 ) Finally, if f gets bigger, there is no effect on labor expropriation. For the effect on minority expropriation, see Lemma 1 in the appendix and its proof.  An increase in labor protection increases wages and pushes workers to use a higher effort that increases the value of production. In a similar way, an increase in the protection granted by corporate law reduces the degree to which private benefits of control are taken at the expense of minority shareholders. The role played by a change in the size of cash-flow rights in the hands of the controller of the firm is ambiguous. The effect is uncertain because there are two countervailing effects in action: ( i ) the smaller the stake of minority shareholders, the smaller the amount that can be taken and hence the smaller the incentive to expropriate minorities. ( ii ) At the same time, a higher stake in cash-flow rights is usually coupled with a higher stake in control rights. It is reasonable to assume that a larger stake in control rights makes the expropriation of minorities easier and hence gives the controller a greater incentive to expropriate minorities. The appendix describes the technical conditions governing the interplay of these two forces and also explains the conditions under which an increase or decrease in the expropriation of minority shareholders has to be expected. In general terms, we can say that an increase in minority expropriation following an increase in cash-flow rights is more likely when the stake in control rights prior to the change was small. When the stake is already large, a further increase is more likely to lead to a reduction in the degree of expropriation.
Concentrated Ownership Interpretation: Firm Controlled by Financial Investors
In cases of concentrated ownership, the most plausible interpretation of this type of firm is that the controlling shareholder (the manager in the model) is a financial investor, such as a venture capital investor or a hedge fund. Unlike in the following sections, the fund does not obtain any non-monetary benefits of control that it might lose by exploiting minority shareholders or reneging on implicit agreements with employees. The fund also has direct power over the manager and it can divert company resources and use them to cover up the exploitation of workers and minority shareholders. The investor is only interested in profits and uses a hit-and-run approach to get the most out of the company by both slashing employee benefits and engaging in self-dealing transactions. In the absence of a private cost of expropriation, legal protection is the only effective deterrent.
Dispersed Ownership Interpretation: Firm Controlled by 'Ruthless' Managers
Under dispersed ownership, a plausible interpretation of the model is a firm where the managers controlling the firm only care about their personal benefits and have no repercussions to fear from exploiting either shareholders or workers. Other than in the case discussed in section 2.3.2 below, there are no social norms reinforcing long-term interaction with workers, and they have no interest in empire-building that might be achieved by building a long-term relationship with an (excessively) large workforce. The manager does not have to fear any indirect repercussions from harming shareholders. There are no sanctions on the level of social norms, and managers also do not have to fear an increased risk of being ousted in a takeover or proxy fight (which would be represented as a cost of expropriation in our model). This may have been the situation facing managers of the companies involved in the US scandals of the early 2000s. These firms were under managerial control, and investor protection, partly in the form of securities law, which obviously did not have a sufficient deterrent effect.
TYPE 2 FIRMS: PRIVATE COST OF EXPROPRIATING WORKERS
In this case, private cost of expropriating workers is borne by the manager. As in the previous section, tunneling transactions will cost the firm because of the deadweight loss resulting from the necessity to devise complex transactions to conceal self-dealing, as well as the cost of the exploitation of workers holdup. These monetary costs reduce the firm's profits and, on top of them, there is a positive private cost of exploiting employees paid by the manager, but not of expropriating minority shareholders.
In our model, the personal costs of expropriation are captured by the parameter , which is the ratio between the private costs borne by the manager and the costs of expropriating labor paid out from the firm's cash. The larger  becomes, the bigger the private costs are in comparison to the direct cost of expropriation.
Furthermore, the existence of the cost of expropriating workers also leads to a shielding effect for minority shareholders. The diminished holdup gains for shareholders also decrease the incentive to expropriate this group. Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
must increase as well. Since 2 ) If p L grows,  ′ c L  gets bigger and thus, since  ′′  0, c L  must become smaller.
3 ) If f gets bigger,  ′ c L  must become smaller, leading to an increase in labor expropriation. Nevertheless, the expropriation of labor is always smaller than in the case of type 1 (or 3) firm since it's always true that
For the effect on minority expropriation, see Lemma 1 in the appendix and its proof. 4 ) Finally, if  increases,  ′ c L  has to increase as well.  For this type of firm, an important result is that workers are not only protected by employment law, but also by corporate law (a result that also holds in type 4 firms, which we will discuss in section 2.5 ). The improvement in the protection of minority shareholders reduces the gains from expropriating minorities and, at the same time, makes it less attractive for the manager to expropriate employees. In fact, when the protection of minorities improves, she has to assign a larger proportion of potential holdup gains to the outside shareholders even if she still must personally bear the full private cost of labor expropriation.
The effect of an increase in labor protection is a reduction in expropriation of workers. The effect of an increase of the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the manager is more complex. Regarding shareholder expropriation, the effect is the same as we have already seen for type 1 firms: an ambiguous one.
22 Interestingly, there is also an effect on labor expropriation: the larger the cash-flow rights in the hands of the manager, the greater labor expropriation is going to be. The reason is that the manager's financial benefits (compared to his private costs) are larger because he has to share them with outside investors to a smaller degree.
Concentrated Ownership Interpretation: The Family-Controlled Firm with Outside Investors
Depending on the particular circumstances, there can be various institutional explanations. Type 2 describes two distinct corporate archetypes. First, in cases where f is high, the manager would be a controlling shareholder. More specifically, the firm could be controlled by an entrepreneurial family, which is common even in large firms in some Continental European countries such as Italy. The literature on family firms suggests that families sometimes enjoy non-pecuniary benefits from control, such as national or regional prestige (Burkart et al., 2003) . Expropriating employees could harm that reputation and make the position of the family's members in the city or region dominated by the company less pleasant. Furthermore, entrepreneurial families may enjoy reigning over a large retinue of employees and therefore suffer a cost on losing some of them. By contrast, the controlling family may care little about the well-being of outside shareholders, which is why there is no private cost of expropriating them.
Italian corporate governance scandals such as Parmalat could provide an example of this situation, since there was apparently little that prevented the controlling families from significant self-dealing transactions with the firm. Minority shareholders were clearly hurt, whereas it is less clear that the same was true for workers. Besides the social and reputational explanation we have given for the private cost of expropriating workers, one could also conceive of the cost as capturing personal risks resulting from stronger legal involvement of employees in the governance of the firm, resulting, for instance, from employee participation systems such as German co-determination. The presence of employee members on the supervisory board could, for example, make litigation against representatives of a controlling family more likely. However, this is not how we interpret our model. p L is intended to capture all legal factors that make it more likely for employees to obtain wages and benefits resulting both from explicit contract and reasonable implicit expectations. This includes legal mechanisms that increase their ex-post bargaining power and that make lawsuits more probable or more likely to be successful.
Dispersed Ownership Interpretation: Managerial Firm
Second, where f is low, the model could apply to what is known as a managerial firm, which can also be described as a Berle-Means firm (Berle and Means, 1932) , in which a publicly traded company is effectively controlled by managers holding only a small share of stocks. Blair and Stout suggest that the (legal and factual) insulation of US boards of directors (and managers) from shareholders may be efficient because it prevents holdup, thus facilitating specific investment by employees and stakeholder groups (Blair and Stout, 1999, 2001:438-441) . This theory seems to assume that employees trust managers because the latter stand to lose something if they expropriate the former. For example, there may be social norms that encourage directors to maintain a reputation of trustworthiness. Furthermore, entrenched managers may have a taste for empire-building, which will often coincide with the interests of workers. In this interpretation of our model, c L would correspond to managers' costs when they forego these possibilities and violate social norms at work in this context. In fact, there seems to be empirical evidence that at least some workers and bondholders benefit from entrenched management (Gokhale et al., 1995; Chemla, 2005:379-380) . Workers and managers are thus often seen as natural allies against hostile takeovers (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) . Note that we are not yet taking the possibility of an effective market for takeovers into account at this point. In this subgroup of cases, managers (and controlling shareholders) are fully entrenched, meaning that the desire to holdup workers will largely depend on financial incentives resulting from their ownership share. Their non-pecuniary costs protect employees from holdup.
Conceivably, the managers' private costs from expropriating workers could also be negative. This would mean that there are other factors balancing the pro-employee bias described above in the Berle-Means firm, such as social norms favoring a strong shareholder primacy norm or executive compensation that succeeds in aligning managerial and shareholder interests.
TYPE 3 FIRMS: PRIVATE COST OF EXPROPRIATING OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS
In this subsection, there is a positive private cost of expropriating minority shareholders, but none for expropriating employees. The firm directly pays the entire cost of exploiting workers (with a reduction in profits). The manager, on the other hand, has a cost of exploiting minority shareholders.
The introduction of a private cost of exploiting minority shareholders is shown by , which is the ratio between the private cost borne by the manager alone and the one paid directly by the firm.
Result 3: When there is a private cost of expropriating shareholders, but not of employees, there is a partial interrelation between the effects of corporate law and labor law.
If minority shareholder protection increases, there is less minority expropriation.
If labor protection increases, there is less labor expropriation.
If f increases, there is an ambiguous effect on minority expropriation.
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Nevertheless, it is more likely that minority expropriation will decrease with respect to type 1 (and 2 ) firms.
If private costs of shareholders expropriation (  ) increase, there is less minority
expropriation.
Shareholder expropriation in type 3 (and 4 )
24 firms is always smaller than in type 1 (and 2 ) firms.
Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
The manager will choose a level of expropriation that satisfies the following first Corporate Governance and the Costs of Expropriation / 471 order conditions.
1 ) If p c increases,
For the effect on minority expropriation, see Lemma 2 in the appendix and its proof. 4 ) Since  appears only in the first order condition for , an increase of  will directly affect , increasing
and hence leading to a reduction of .
)
To prove this point, it suffices to remember that it is always true that
A change in the level of labor protection has the same effects as in the previous sections. Better minority protection induces a reduction in the level of minority expropriation as in the case of a type 1 firm. Nevertheless, the minority expropriation in this case is always smaller since (due to the effect of the private costs) expropriating minorities is more costly than it is in type 1 firms. The effect of an increase in the share of cash-flow rights owned by the controller is ambiguous as in the previous cases. What we know is that, ceteris paribus, for any given share of cash-flow rights, an additional increase in cash-flow rights is more likely to decrease minority expropriation in type 3 (and 4 ) firms than in the other types. In any case, minority expropriation is always smaller in type 3 (and 4 ) firms than in type 1 (and 2 ) firms.
Concentrated Ownership Interpretation: Professional Partnerships
A good interpretation for type 3 in a concentrated ownership structure is comparatively hard to find. The most plausible one seems to be a professional partnership, where partners are in a long-term relationship and typically will care about each other, therefore making mutual expropriation costly due to social repercussions.
25 On the other hand, shareholders may care little about employees and not suffer any cost from reneging on the employees' expectations (one could think, for example, of associates in a law firm, where, according to the conventional wisdom, turnover is very high).
Dispersed Ownership Interpretation: Publicly Traded Firms Subject to a Vibrant Market for Corporate Control
In the context of a publicly traded firm with dispersed ownership, the private cost of expropriating shareholders could be the result of institutions aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders, such as a functioning system of executive compensation, or an effective market for corporate control. Arguably, such factors are much less present in one paradigmatic dispersed ownership system, the US, than it was often thought. In recent years, scholars have suggested that compensation schemes actually found in practice are more a rent-seeking device for managers than a solution to agency problems, since managers themselves have considerable influence on the design of compensation packages (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . Furthermore, Delaware corporate law provides nearly perfect takeover defenses, namely the combination of staggered boards and poison pills (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . By contrast, takeover law in the UK, the second important dispersed ownership system, is entirely different, as the City Code on Mergers and Takeovers has provided an obligation for managers to stay neutral in takeover contests since the late 1960s (Armour and Skeel, 2007) . As a leading scholar of UK company law put it, when facing a hostile bid, "the directors of the target are thrown back on their powers of persuasion" (Davies, 2008:987) . The model could represent a publicly traded British firm, where directors face a more significant cost in the form of an increased probability of a hostile takeover when they expropriate minority shareholders.
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Note that we have described private costs of expropriation as being primarily reputational in nature. There are other plausible interpretations. First, controlling shareholders may bear considerable pecuniary cost to conceal self-dealing transactions. Second, personal lawsuits against managers/controlling shareholders could create such a cost if there is a risk that they may have to make personal payments. This is a possible interpretation of our model, although not primarily the one that we would have applied.
27 Substantive corporate law and the effectiveness of its enforcement are intimately intertwined. To be precise, however, a personal cost of litigation risk would be jointly captured by p c and  (which represents the relative size of the private cost to expropriate minorities compared to the direct cost paid by the firm). However, at least in large, publicly traded firms, personal costs are negligible. Where shareholder litigation is available and common, as it is particularly in the US, managers are usually insulated from personal liability by D&O insurance.
TYPE 4 FIRMS: PRIVATE COST OF EXPROPRIATING BOTH SHAREHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES
In this case, there is a private cost of expropriating both minority shareholders and labor, i.e. the manager pays private costs of exploiting both workers and minority shareholders. Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
The manager will choose a level of expropriation that satisfies the following first order conditions. 2 ) If p L grows,  ′ c L  gets bigger and thus, since  ′′  0, c L  must become smaller.
3 ) If f gets bigger,  ′ c L  must become smaller, leading to an increase in labor expropriation. Nevertheless, for any level of f , expropriation is always smaller than in the case of type 1 (or 3) firms since it is always true that 1
For the effect on minority expropriation, see Lemma 1 in the appendix and its proof. 4 ) Since  appears only in the first order condition for , an increase of  will directly affect , reducing it. 5 ) Since  appears only in the first order condition for , an increase of  will directly affect , making it smaller. 6 ) To prove this point, it suffices to remember that it is always true that
The effect of a change in labor protection is the same as in all other cases. The effect of a change in minority protection is identical to that in type 3 firms. The effect of a change in the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the controller has, with regard to minority shareholders, the same effects discussed for type 3 firms and, with respect to labor, the same effects that we discussed for type 2 firms. This is not surprising since the manager of a type 4 firm bears the same private cost of expropriating minorities as in a type 3 firm, and the same private costs of expropriating labor as in a type 2 firm.
Concentrated Ownership Interpretation: Closely-Held Family Firm
In the concentrated ownership situation, the most intuitive interpretation would seem to be a closely-held family firm. Minority shareholders who may be exploited may be family members or friends with a long-standing social relationship to the manager. The manager's personal utility function would therefore display some degree of altruism with respect to this group. Furthermore, as a leading member of the entrepreneurial family, he also cares about the well-being of long-term employees he closely interacts with on a day-to-day basis, and draws non-pecuniary benefits from the family's social standing in the town where the company is located. As long as these conditions hold, expropriation of either type is therefore unlikely.
Interpretation Under Dispersed Ownership: Publicly Traded Firm Subject to a Vibrant Market for Corporate Control
The dispersed ownership case of this version of the model resembles that of section 2.4.2, with the exception of the additional private cost of "exploiting" workers. The manager may still be subject to a vibrant market for corporate control (represented by the private cost of expropriating shareholders), but at the same time care about the well-being of workers, for example, because of countervailing social norms. The exact effects depend on the relative magnitude of these effects. For example, if the private cost of expropriating workers is high enough, the manager may choose not to "expropriate" workers or to resist a takeover attempt in spite of the benefits he could obtain on the shareholder side in such a situation.
Conceivably, the costs of exploiting either shareholders or workers could also be negative. For example, the cost of exploiting minority shareholders could be negative because assets that are "tunneled" out of the firm could offer an advantage to the shareholder-manager that the firm does not have, for example, because of synergy effects that increase their outside value. In the case of a negative cost of exploiting employees, she would reap an additional benefit because of, for instance, a lower likelihood of being ousted in a hostile takeover.
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS
As we have seen, the effects of changes in shareholder protection, labor protection, and concentration of ownership depend on the structure of the firm and the respective private costs of expropriation. The following table summarizes some of the results.  describes an increase in the value of the variable,  indicates a decrease, and  means that the variable may either get smaller or larger, depending on specific conditions explained in detail in the appendix. The first result of our model is that changes in the level of shareholder protection may also affect workers, who are not its intended beneficiaries. A change in minority protection may affect the behavior of the manager in respect to the workers. From this perspective, it appears desirable that policymaking in the two bodies of law should be coordinated in order to not set the wrong incentives.
Empirically, countries with strong shareholder protection tend to have weak protection of labor, and vice versa (Roe, 2002:263-264; La Porta et al., 2008:311; Belloc and Pagano, 2009) . To a certain extent, our model confirms that shareholder protection and labor protection may sometimes serve as substitutes for one another: when there is a private cost of exploiting workers, labor will benefit from either, since an increase in minority protection reduces the incentive for the manager to invest resources in labor expropriation. Workers derive an additional benefit from minority protection because the manager would have to share a larger proportion of holdup gains (and the cash cost of expropriation) with minority shareholders. His inability to reap all of these gains reduces his incentive to engage in expropriation activities given his unchanged private cost. As stated, this particular consequence applies only where there is a positive cost of expropriating labor, as in the case of a controlling family or insulated managers that identify with employees (e.g. because of social norms). These might be the circumstances where investors and employees may engage in political coalitions against management (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005:65-67) .
Most importantly for the point originally motivating the paper, the model also illustrates that a change in ownership that leads to a higher (lower) concentration in ownership is associated with an augmented (reduced) degree of expropriation of workers when there is a private cost of expropriating workers. In the absence of such a cost, the owner will choose the same (high) degree of worker expropriation regardless of his share in the company. The private cost inhibits expropriation because of its countervailing incentive. In the case of a larger ownership share, the manager has a greater financial incentive to exploit workers, which is why the private cost factor is more likely overcome by the private gains.
One of the motivating questions for this paper was whether controlling shareholders or "independent" managers are better able to bond with employees (or other stakeholders) and incentivize them to make specific investment. Ceteris paribus, the answer is managers, since they have less to gain from creating holdup situations that harm employees. However, in practice ceteris paribus conditions rarely apply. A number of important factors complicate the issue, such as social norms applying to managers or idiosyncratic preferences of controlling families. We have interpreted these factors in our model as private costs of expropriation that shield workers from holdup. For reasons outside of our model, both managers' and controlling shareholders' "attunement" with employee interests (or shareholder interests) may shift over time. The shielding effect for employees may even be turned into its opposite if managers are particularly attuned to shareholder interests for institutional reasons. Nevertheless, the consistent result that higher ownership concentration leads to more expropriation of labor (given a positive cost of expropriation) may help to explain why countries with higher ownership concentrations tend to have stronger employment law and pro-labor institutions affecting corporate governance (Gelter, 2009:168-181 ).
In comparison, exploitation of minority shareholders may increase or decrease when ownership concentration increases. The simple intuitive explanation is that the amount that can be gained decreases with the minority's ownership share, while at the same time, the ability to expropriate minorities increases with the share of ownership, creating a countervailing effect. It is therefore more difficult to make any generalized inferences about differences between corporate governance systems in this respect. One possible lesson is that a different degree of both investor protection and labor protection may be desirable in different economic systems and in the same system as it develops over time. For example, when social norms that inhibit managerial self-dealing recede, stronger corporate law may be needed to maintain the same level of investor protection. Similarly, when social norms or reputational sanctions attuning controlling families with the interests of their workers erode, stronger employment law may be needed to achieve the same degree of protection for employees (and consequently worker effort). This conclusion rests on the assumption that both stronger corporate law and employment law are costly. For example, stronger investor protection might increase the number of abusive lawsuits or inhibit managerial creativity in decision-making. Likewise, strong (or badly designed) employment law may make some less intrinsically motivated employees complacent. Given these costs, it is therefore unlikely that the strongest possible laws are optimal (even though these repercussions are outside of the scope of our model).
CONCLUSION
Our paper has attempted to elucidate factors that may eliminate incentives for controlling shareholders and managers to engage in self-dealing behavior to the detriment of minority shareholders and in taking holdup and other opportunities to exploit stakeholders, particularly labor. In particular, the previous literature has often assumed that either managers of Berle-Means firms or large blockholders are better able to provide credible commitment that allows stakeholders to make firm-specific investment. Large ownership stakes may of course create an incentive to exploit labor, since the financial benefit from this exploitation is comparatively large. However, an important factor for both managers or blockholders is the private cost of expropriation. For example, the CEO of a managerial firm may enjoy empire-building or social prestige from controlling a large number of employees, which will create a disincentive against holding up labor. Similarly, a blockholding family may enjoy social prestige within the local community. As a result, they may refrain from exploiting labor's firm-specific investment. Theoretically, any judgments, settlements and litigation costs borne personally by a manager or controlling shareholder also serve as incentives to refrain from exploiting labor. For analytical purposes, we have also extended the concept of costs of expropriation to the exploitation of minority shareholders through private benefits of control. For example, in a family firm, the controlling shareholder member may be reluctant to expropriate his family members because he fears social repercussions. Most of all, our model shows that investor protection and labor protection are interdependent and may partly act as substitutes, at least concerning workers, who are to some degree also protected by corporate law. Given the interdependence of both fields of law and their costs, it is important to coordinate policies.
APPENDIX: EFFECT
To assess whether a change in the share of ownership affects the level of expropriation, we compute the total differential of c c , f .
Since the value of ∂cc, f  ∂cc is subject to a specific equilibrium condition for each type of firm, we can compute the change in the equilibrium value of c c induced by a change in f . In order to compute this change, it is sufficient to compute the total differential of equations ( 1 ), ( 2 ), ( 3 ) and ( 4 ).
TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2 FIRMS
Lemma 1: For type 1 and 2 firms, the effect of an increase in f on the level of expropriation of minorities (  ) is ambiguous. It is more likely that an increase in f will lead to an increase in expropriation when 1.
is large, or 2. f is small.
Proof. The first order condition for type 1 and 2 firms is the same, as we can easily see from equations ( 1 ) and ( 2 ). By computing the total differential on both sides of equation ( 1 ), we find that
and hence, combinining equations ( 5 ) and ( 6 ), we can compute the change in .
ownership system, where takeover law has provided obligations for managers to stay neutral in takeover contests since the late 1960s. See Armour and Skeel, 2007. 5 . Legal systems often distinguish between (individual) employment law and (collective) labor law. We use both terms interchangeably, as our model does not distinguish between these two bodies of law. 6. By these terms we refer to actions by managers (or controlling shareholders) reneging on expectations by these two groups, thereby decreasing their utility. In most cases these actions belong to the classical agency and holdup problems familiar from contract theory. 7. In this way, we try to capture the asymmetry between managers and workers. We assume that managers are in a stronger position either because of their hierarchical relationship with workers or because of an information advantage.
8. p c captures both protection against the diversion of assets ex-ante (e.g. through early-stage accounting manipulation) or ex-post (e.g. through self-dealing). The rationale here is that the possibility of a successful lawsuit is likely to be similar in a given legal system. 9. We are in debt to an anonymous referee for this observation. The amount of resources that can be diverted depends upon the limits set by accounting standards and the degree of protection granted by corporate law. 10. Obviously, payments to employees concurrently show up as expenses in financial statements. What we seek to capture here is the possibility that results showing up in financial statements or in financial planning are used to justify an unexpectedly strong restraint in bargaining with employees. 11. K could be interpreted as a measure of the quality of accounting standards. The greater K is, the less information the applicable accounting standards provide. In this case, the amount of resources that can be hidden through accounting manipulation is, at least partially, limited by an increase in the minority protection p c . For example, pre-trial discovery under US procedural law may help to improve the protection of investors against accounting manipulation because plaintiffs have better access to information than those in most other jurisdictions.
12.  should be seen as a reference value corresponding to the workers' reasonable expectations. Under a limited set of circumstances,  could also be a contractually stipulated amount of the share of production paid to labor (assuming that the contract is complete, labor law is perfectly defined and the manager does not invest any resources in active worker expropriation). 13. The degree of protection granted to workers by law could even be excessive. In our case this would be a value of 1  p L  1  . In this case, the protection granted by labor law would grant workers a complete protection against holdup and would allow them to get more than the contractual share of the production. However, the possibility of protection being greater than 1 is outside the scope of the paper and does not have an effect on our analysis. 14. We discuss the exact nature of the cost of expropriation in some detail in sections 2.2 through 2.5.
15.
To be more precise,  ′  0,  ′′  0 and lim
16. We use the term capital with reference to the amount of cash-flow rights in the hands of the controller. The amount of cash-flow rights in the hands of a controlling shareholder may be substantially different from his voting rights in the case of pyramids, cross-ownership and dual class share structures; in some cases it may be possible to control the company with only a small share in cash-flow rights. See Bebchuk et al., 2000. 17 . In other words, we are assuming that the marginal cost of expropriation is increasing. 18. See Lemma 1 in the appendix. 19. See Lemma 1 in the appendix. 20. We discuss this case in section 2.5. 21. We discuss this case in section 2.4. 22. For more details, see the discussion in section 2.2 and in the appendix. 23. See Lemma 2 in the appendix for more details. 24. As we will discuss in section 2.5. 25. The existence of a "manager" that could exploit other partners may seem unlikely at first glance, since normally no individual partner will have a controlling stake. However, several partners could form a coalition against other partners to jointly control the firm. 26. Social norms may also play a role here. Bainbridge (2003:582) suggests that it is largely a social norm of shareholder primacy (and not the market for corporate control) that keeps US directors aligned with shareholder interests. 27. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
